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Interminable Parade Rest
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING
SERVICE CONNECTION IN VETERANS DISABILITY
COMPENSATION CLAIMS WHEN RECORDS ARE
LOST OR DESTROYED
Jessica Lynn Wherry†
INTRODUCTION
Jonathan McMullan1 served on active duty in the U. S.
Army in the mid- to late-1970s. He was one of many who
remained stateside during the Vietnam War. After an honorable
discharge, he attempted to reenlist but was denied because of a
medical diagnosis of hypertension at the time of discharge. That
diagnosis would have been included in his service medical
records as part of his discharge processing. In the early 1990s,
McMullan filed a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) for service-connected disability compensation due to the
hypertension. VA sent McMullan three letters while developing
his claim. In its initial response to his claim, VA indicated it was
waiting for evidence before deciding his claim and notified
McMullan that it would obtain the evidence from his service

† Associate Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown Law. J.D., The
George Washington University Law School; M.S.Sc., Syracuse University Maxwell School of
Public Affairs; B.A., Lawrence University. Thank you to Jeff Gold, Patty Roberts, Jeffrey
Shulman, Saleema Snow, and Mike Stone for supportive and valuable feedback. I am also
grateful for the advice I received workshopping this project through an Association of Legal
Writing Directors-sponsored Writing Workshop and a Georgetown Law summer workshop
series. Thank you to Marie Zisa for helpful research assistance and to TMR for the concert
and solitude that inspired me to complete this manuscript.
1 Parade rest is the military term for stand by and wait for the next command.
DEP’T OF NAVY, DRILL AND CEREMONIES MANUAL art. 2.1 (2013), https://www.usna.edu/
Commandant/Directives/Instructions/5000-5999/COMDTMIDNINST_5060.1_with_CH1_
and_CH2_Drill_and_Ceremonies_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2TC-K4A5] (requiring
“[s]ilence and immobility”). This is my client’s story; his name has been changed. Unless
otherwise indicated, all references to documents are from McMullan’s VA claims file (C-file). I
received an electronic C-file in July 2015 including documents through March 2, 2015. Page
references are to the 603-page PDF I received from VA Records Management Center.
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medical records.2 The second letter updated McMullan on the
claims process and notified him that service medical records
were required.3 The third letter provided McMullan with a list
of requested evidence needed to take further action on his claim.4
McMullan requested his service medical records in October
1991, but never received them.5
Less than a year later, VA decided McMullan’s claim:
denied.6 It did not consider McMullan’s service medical records,
nor did it consider any other evidence other than the claim form.
The decision letter indicated that VA needed a list of information
before taking final action, including medical evidence of
hypertension at the time of discharge.7 The letter explained that
VA never received that requested evidence and advised
McMullan to submit the evidence at any time.8
McMullan and VA continued to try to obtain his service
medical records, but to no avail. In response to repeated
requests, the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC)9
indicated that it was “unable to locate a military service record

2 Letter from Veterans Admin., Balt. Reg’l Office, C-file at 199 (Mar. 15, 1991)
(on file with author) (“claim awaits evidence or information which we are obtaining
from . . . service medical records”).
3 Letter from Veterans Admin., Balt. Reg’l Office, C-file at 200 (Mar. 18, 1991)
(on file with author) (“We have requested your service medical records from the service
department, but if you have any service records in your possession, please send us a copy.
We will not deny your claim just because you do not have copies of your service records
in your possession. Please submit the requested evidence as soon as possible. If we do
not receive this evidence within one year from the date of this letter, we cannot pay the
benefit to which you may be entitled earlier than the date we do receive it.”).
4 Letter from Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Balt. Reg’l Office, C-file at 204–05
(Sept. 21, 1991) (on file with author) (VA asked McMullan for “[m]edical evidence to
indicate [his] hypertension ha[d] existed since [his] discharge from service.” There was
also a statement that VA was “trying to obtain [McMullan’s] service medical records to
substantiate [his] claim.”).
5 McMullan Request Pertaining to Medical Records, C-file at 216–17 (Oct. 3,
1991) (on file with author) (In box 4 asking for purpose of the documents request,
McMullan wrote “for VA benefits service connection hypertension.”).
6 Letter from Veterans Affairs Adjudication Officer, Balt. Reg’l Office, C-file
at 220 (May 21, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Adjudication Officer].
7 Id. Medical evidence is one of the typical types of evidence required to establish
a service-connected disability claim. See Evidence Requirements, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFF., https://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/evidence.asp [https://perma.cc/LG76K2CP] (listing the evidence requirements and procedures for filing a compensation claim
with the VA); see also infra Section I.A (listing elements of service connection).
8 Letter from Adjudication Officer, supra note 6.
9 The NPRC is part of the National Archives and Records Administration.
Military Personnel Records, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/st-louis/militarypersonnel [https://perma.cc/9E6V-5KQL].
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at this time.”10 That was on February 5, 1993. As often happens,
McMullan gave up his claim at that time.11
Problems with VA have been widely reported in the news
and have perhaps contributed to the growth of law school
veterans clinics12 and veterans law scholarship.13 By statute,
10 Reply to Request for Info. from Nat’l Pers. Records Ctr., C-file at 223 (Feb.
5, 1993) (on file with author).
11 McMullan inspired this article. I represent him in a pro bono case through
the Veterans Legal Assistance Project, Homeless Persons Representation Project in
Baltimore, Maryland. I wrote this article in an effort to expose the contradictions in how
claims are treated when records are lost or destroyed. The information about McMullan’s
claim is accurate, though what I’ve mentioned here is an incomplete picture. My client
has filed a number of claims seeking disability benefits for a variety of other illnesses
and injuries, including exposure to Agent Orange and posttraumatic stress disorder. In
an effort to provide a clean narrative, my focus here is on his original claim of
hypertension.
12 See Karen Sloan, Law Clinics Answer the Call; Veterans Finding Allies in
Dealing with the VA and More, NAT’L L.J. (July 6, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/almID/1202731282103/ [https://perma.cc/5L9S-WAVB] (“[T]he number
of law school clinics and pro bono projects addressing veterans’ unmet legal needs has
exploded.” In 2015, there were “approximately [fifty] schools operat[ing] clinics or pro bono
programs.”).
13 Those problems and others are not repeated here in the interest of focusing
in on a narrow issue of how claims are evaluated when service medical records are lost
or destroyed. Still, that VA has rampant and at least somewhat ongoing problems likely
has some relevance to the specific problem discussed here. See Luanne Rife, Veterans
Injured by Service Wait Years for Compensation Hearings, ROANOKE TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017),
http://www.roanoke.com/news/veterans-injured-by-service-wait-years-for-compensationhearings/article_133660ff-479c-5234-b86e-f98ac7fecd52.html [https://perma.cc/BFQ49PL6] (“470,000 veterans [are] caught in the bureaucratic purgatory of the VA’s benefits
appeals process. On average, a veteran who has appealed will wait about five years for
a decision, as his case gets passed back and forth between the regional office and the
appeals board. About half the time, if the case goes to the appeals board, it gets kicked
back to the regional office for more information.”); see also Debra A. Draper, Dir. of
Healthcare at the U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Comm. on
Veteran’s Affairs, House of Representatives, VA Healthcare: Actions Needed to Improve
Access to Primary Care for Newly Enrolled Veterans (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/680/676679.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KEZ-FWNR]; Dave Boyer, VA Still Plagued by
Problems Two Years After Scandal, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2016), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/3/va-still-plagued-by-problems-two-yearsafter-scand/ [https://perma.cc/PUC9-2BE3]. To be fair, there have been efforts to respond
to the challenges. VA was a priority in the waning Obama administration. See, e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs Office of Pub. & Intergovernmental Affairs, Obama
Administration Announces Nearly 50-Percent Decline in Veteran Homelessness (Aug. 1,
2016), http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2805 [https://perma.cc/KX3TV5TW]; Allison Hickey, VA Claims Backlog now Under 100,000—Lowest in Department
History, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.: VANTAGE POINT (Aug. 24, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://
www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/22436/va-claims-backlog-now-under-100000-lowest-in-departmenthistory/ [https://perma.cc/UG4Z-BHPW]. Even though the claims backlog has lessened,
that does not mean more accuracy in claims decisions. See, e.g., VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, REVIEW OF SPECIAL
MONTHLY COMPENSATION HOUSEBOUND BENEFITS ii (2016), http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/
VAOIG-15-02707-277.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KEB-QKSZ] (finding 18 percent error rate
for cases involving veterans entitled to statutory benefits and 51 percent error rate for
paying housebound rate of compensation). For examples of veterans law scholarship
related to the claims backlog and other VA inefficiencies, see Alexandra S. Haar, Note,
Sweet Dreams Aren’t Made of These: How the VA’s Disability Compensation Program
Leaves Veterans Alone in the Nightmare of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 88 WASH. U.
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veterans are eligible for disability compensation benefits for
illness or injury connected to the veteran’s service in the armed
forces.14 The process of seeking benefits is intended to be nonadversarial, requiring VA to assist veterans in developing their
claims.15 VA’s nagging problems, including poor management
and a lack of accountability, are unfortunately not limited to
veterans receiving disability benefits, but extend to veterans
who never make it past the claim stage.16
Typically, service medical records are used to establish
service connection in disability compensation claims.17 When
those records are unobtainable, there are alternative sources of
medical or lay evidence that can be used to establish service
connection.18 When service medical records are lost or destroyed
and there is no other contemporaneous medical evidence,
however, the veteran likely suffers an absolute bar to receiving a
favorable decision about service connection. Any decision made
without service medical records is necessarily based on a lack of
evidence rather than an evaluation of the evidence.
Lost records are a well-known and widespread challenge
to veterans seeking disability compensation. The lack of service
medical records results in decisions framed as insufficient to
establish service connection, but the practical reality is that
these decisions treat a lack of evidence as sufficient for a
negative decision. In cases where a veteran’s records are lost or
destroyed due to no fault of the veteran, the lack of evidence
typically results in a claim’s denial or delay on the basis that
L. REV. 969, 986 (2011); Daniel L. Nagin, Goals vs. Deadlines: Notes on the VA Disability
Claims Backlog, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 50, 50 (2015); Stacey-Rae Simcox, Lightening the
VA’s Rucksack: A Proposal for Higher Education Medical-Legal Partnerships to Assist
the VA in efficiently and Accurately Granting Veterans Disability Compensation, 25
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 145 (2015).
14 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012).
15 Id. § 5103A (explaining that VA is supposed to assist veterans in developing
their claims).
16 For example, McMullan’s time in the claim stage has lasted nearly four decades
due to his lack of service medical records. Other veterans never make it past the claim stage due
to how VA treats certain types of discharges. See VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, UNDERSERVED: HOW
THE VA WRONGLY EXCLUDES VETERANS WITH BAD PAPER 2 (2016), https://www.swords-toplowshares.org/wp-content/uploads/Underserved.pdf [https://perma.cc/29GX-AJ7S] (“Only 1%
of service members discharged in 2011 are barred from VA services due to Congress’ criteria. VA
regulations cause the exclusion of an additional 5.5% of all service members.”).
17 See Evidence Requirements, supra note 7.
18 M21-1, Part III, Subpart iii, Chapter 2, Section E—Unique Claims and
Situations That Require Special Handling, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (last updated 2017),
https://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/
locale/en-US/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000014159/M21-1,-Part-III,-Subpartiii,-Chapter-2,-Section-E%E2%80%94-Unique-Claims-and-Situations-That-Require-SpecialHandling (“III.iii.2.E.2.b. Types of Evidence VA May Use To Supplement or as a Substitute
for STRs”).
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there is no evidence supporting the service connection.19 A 1973
fire at the NPRC in St. Louis, Missouri (1973 fire) “destroyed
approximately 16–18 million” records.20 Even in cases involving
the 1973 fire, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has rejected an argument in favor of presumptive service
connection and allowed an absence of records to justify a
negative rating decision.21
Unfortunately, the lost records problem extends beyond
the disastrous 1973 fire and McMullan is one among thousands of
veterans impacted by this problem. Without these military records,
a veteran faces an uphill battle when “the burden unfairly shifts to
the veteran to use his own resources to obtain alternative
evidence.”22 And often, the burden creates an impossible hurdle;
“veterans are either denied the benefits sought or the adjudication
of the claim(s) is significantly delayed.”23 These unjust results and
delays affect “literally thousands of veterans.”24

19 See Wading Through Warehouses of Paper: The Challenges of Transitioning
Veterans Records to Paperless Technology, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability
Assistance and Mem’l Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112 Cong. 35 (2012)
(prepared statement of Michael R. Viterna, President, National Association of Veterans
Advocates) [hereinafter Wading Through Warehouses of Paper] https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg78772/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg78772.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NSB5SL6] (“Veterans have earned certain benefits from their military service and a paper
driven system of records and a lack of service department records are impediments, if
not preclusive, to the receipt of those benefits.”); id. at 2 (opening statement of Hon. Jon
Runyan, Chairman, Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs) (“Often,
a single record or notation can be the difference in whether a veteran’s disability claim is
granted or denied. This is why we must work together to ensure that no records are lost,
overlooked or otherwise unable to be associated with an individual disability claim.”).
20 Veterans’ FAQ, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/veterans/faq.html#9
[https://perma.cc/4C82-PHQV] (“Archival Records, FAQ . . . Was my record destroyed in the
1973 Fire? If so, what information is available to me?”).
21 See, e.g., Cromer v. Nicholson, 455 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(describing the appeal to the Veterans Court as “a single issue, arguing that the Veterans
Court should have applied an ‘adverse presumption’ favoring service connection in
circumstances where medical records are lost or destroyed while in possession of the
government” (quoting Cromer v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 215, 216 (2005))). The Court of
Veterans Appeals has similarly ruled. See, e.g., Gregory v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 563, 569
(1996) (“[T]here are no service medical records (SMRs) to show an in-service rectal
bleeding problem because the SMRs were lost or destroyed . . . .”); Willis v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 66, 70 (1991) (“[S]ince the VA lost the veteran’s service records, there was no
way for the VA psychiatrist to confirm that the diagnosis of personality disorder had
been made or why it was made . . . .”).
22 Wading Through Warehouses of Paper, supra note 19, at 40 (prepared
statement of Michael R. Viterna, President, National Association of Veterans Advocates).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 42 (prepared statement of Jeffrey Hall, Assistant National Legislative
Director, Disabled American Veterans); see also id. at 39 (prepared statement of Michael
R. Viterna, President, National Association of Veterans Advocates) (“We have learned
from the Vietnam Veterans of America, for instance, that in 3,956 issues remanded for
veterans they represented between 2003 and 2001, military service records were missing
in 954 issues.”).
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Despite this recognition of the negative consequences on
veterans when their records are lost or destroyed, neither VA
nor Congress has taken steps to relax the evidentiary burden on
veterans.25 The time has come to respond to this ongoing problem
by creating a statutory and regulatory scheme enforceable by
courts that is specifically designed to give the veteran the benefit
of the doubt in the case of lost records.
This article proceeds in Part I by explaining the serviceconnected disability compensation system with a particular
focus on the element of service connection. Part II illustrates the
results of the current approach that treats lack of service
medical records as evidence of no service connection, discusses
how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has ruled in
cases of no records, and addresses the impact of those cases on
McMullan’s pending claim. Part III offers administrative and
statutory remedies in the form of relaxed evidentiary standards.
The remedies are applied to McMullan’s case to illustrate how
the relaxed evidentiary standards would work in practice. The
article concludes with an update on McMullan’s case and a
reinforced call to action.
I.

SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY COMPENSATION

Service-connected disability compensation is just one of
many benefits veterans may be entitled to due to their military
service.26 Understanding the eligibility and entitlement criteria
for disability compensation is a critical step to reforming it.
“Disability Compensation is a monthly tax-free [monetary] benefit
paid to Veterans who are . . . disabled because of injuries or
diseases that were incurred in or aggravated during active duty,
active duty for training, or inactive duty training.”27 Disability
25 See id. at 31 (prepared statement of Hon. Jerry McNerney, Ranking
Democratic Member) (“Congress hears complaints of lost, missing, destroyed or
unassociated files all too often. Information affecting a Veteran’s claim should be better
protected by those charged with its care. . . . Veterans and their families should not be
burdened with the responsibility of re-creating lost files or providing multiple copies of
records that once were in the DoD and VA’s possession.”).
26 See Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://
www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/ [https://perma.cc/9FGR-E6RU] (Based on program-specific
eligibility criteria, veterans may be entitled to a wide-range of benefits including the GI
Bill, pension, and home loan incentives.).
27 Disability
Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://
www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/types-disability.asp [https://perma.cc/SCG4HA8S]; see also Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/
compensation/ [https://perma.cc/584P-G2EN] (“Compensation may also be paid for postservice disabilities that are considered related or secondary to disabilities occurring in
service and for disabilities presumed to be related to circumstances of military service, even
though they may arise after service. Generally, the degrees of disability specified are also
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compensation affects millions of veterans28 and has been the
subject of many of the negative reports about VA in recent years,
especially delayed claims processing.29
A.

Elements of Service Connection

Disability compensation is awarded only when there is a
service connection to the veteran’s current disability or disease.30
Service connection “means that the facts, shown by evidence,
establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in
disability was incurred coincident with service in the Armed
Forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein.”31
There are four types of service connection: direct service
connection, service connection by aggravation, secondary service
connection, and presumptive service connection.32 First, an inservice event or condition can establish direct service
connection.33 Second, by showing that an in-service event or
condition aggravated an existing disability, a disability that
existed at the time of entering service, a veteran can establish
service connection by aggravation.34 Third, a showing that a
disability is “proximately due to or chronically aggravated by a
service connected” disease or disability can establish a secondary

designed to compensate for considerable loss of working time from exacerbations or
illnesses.”).
28 Not including service-connected death benefit recipients, VA paid $64.71
billion in compensation benefits to 4,356,443 veterans in FY 2016. VETERANS BENEFITS
ADMIN., ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016 8 (2017), https://www.benefits.va.gov/
REPORTS/abr/ABR-All_Sections_FY16_06292017.pdf [https:// perma.cc/NPS8-DLSB] (VA
reported approximately 4.75 million compensation and service-connected death benefit
recipients for a total of $71.03 billion paid in compensation benefits in FY 2016).
29 See, e.g., Rife, supra note 13. Since the reports about the egregious number of
pending and backlogged claims, VA has managed to respond by decreasing the numbers of
pending claims as well as increasing the quality of claims processing. According to the VA
website anyway. Detailed Claims Data, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://benefits.va.gov/
REPORTS/detailed_claims_data.asp [https://perma.cc/2LW6-6F99] (“We can see that VBA
employees are completing more compensation claims than ever before. More than three
million claims were processed in the past three fiscal years, three times the amount completed
in 2000. Quality is also increasing as quality ratings were up 4 percent in the past year,
reversing a four-year decline.”).
30 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012).
31 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2017).
32 Jeff Gold & Michael Stone, Presentation at the Veteran Benefits Training:
Veterans’ Legal Assistance Project (VLAP) 23–44 (Jan. 30, 2014) (on file with author).
33 The veteran is responsible “to present and support a claim.” 38 U.S.C.
§ 5107(a). But the veteran’s burden of proof is “remarkably low when compared to other
legal burdens.” Simcox, supra note 13, at 145; see also supra Section I.B.2.
34 38 U.S.C. § 1153; 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(a). For service connection by aggravation, the
veteran must show increase in disability during service, “unless there is a specific finding that
the increase in disability is due to the natural progress of the disease.” 38 U.S.C. § 1153; 38
C.F.R. § 3.306(a).
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service connection.35 Fourth, presumptive service connection exists
without any specific in-service event even when no evidence is
available.36 Service connection is wide-reaching, including injuries
incurred while on duty and events experienced outside of duty but
while in an active duty status.37
By way of illustration, the VA website offers two
examples. In the first example, an Army Reservist on weekend
drill “injures her knee while participating in a physical training
class.”38 Even though the event occurred over the weekend, since
it took place while she was on active duty, it counts as service
connected.39 In the second example, an honorably discharged
sailor fell from a bunk while on active duty.40 He injured his back
as a result of a fall, and since he fell while he was on active duty,
it was a service-connected injury.41
The elements for eligibility of a service-connected
disability claim are not defined by statute, but rather have been
defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims.42 For purposes of understanding the evidentiary burden
on a veteran seeking service-connected disability compensation,
there are three eligibility elements to a claim43: (1) current
disability or disease, (2) in-service event of disability or disease,
and (3) nexus between service and the disability or disease.44 The
35 Gold & Stone, supra note 32, at 40; see also Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439,
448 (1995); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a)–(b).
36 See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307–09; see also infra Section I.B.3.
37 Disability Compensation, supra note 27.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484 (2006), aff’d, 226 F. App’x 1004
(Fed. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
see also Simcox, supra note 13, at 145 (“The requirements for establishing entitlement
to receive benefits for disabilities incurred in service are found in the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims’ 1995 decision in Caluza v. Brown. First, the veteran must be able
to establish that he is suffering from a current disability . . . . Second, the veteran must
establish that he suffered an event during his active service that caused or aggravated
his current condition . . . . Finally, the veteran must provide evidence that his current
disability is in fact caused by that in-service event.” (footnotes omitted)).
43 There are other threshold criteria to establishing a claim, but those elements
are the not the focus of most service-connected disability claims. For example, veteran
status, and conditions of service. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (defining veteran).
44 Simcox, supra note 13, at 145–46; see also Dingess, 19 Vet. App. at 484.
(“Although the term ‘claim’ is not defined in title 38, U.S. Code, the caselaw of the Federal
Circuit and this Court has established that a service-connection claim that provides for
disability-compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 (war time) or 1131 (peacetime)
consists of the following five elements: ‘(1) [V]eteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3)
a connection between the veteran’s service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and
(5) effective date of the disability.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet.
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VA website’s version of the requisite elements for disability
compensation highlights the evidentiary burden on the veteran.45
To establish service connection, there must be “[m]edical evidence
of a current physical or mental disability” as well as “[e]vidence of
a relationship between [the] disability and an injury, disease, or
event in military service.”46 Specifically, “[m]edical records or
medical opinions are required to establish this relationship.”47 VA
further notes that it “may conclude that certain current
disabilities were caused by service, even if there is no specific
evidence proving this in [a] particular claim.”48 Some of these
presumed disabilities are related to exposure to gas or herbicide
in designated geographical areas.49 Both the veteran and VA are
responsible for developing a service-connected disability
compensation claim, and there are a number of unique duties
and evidentiary burdens within the service-connected disability
compensation system.50
B.

Duties and Evidentiary Burdens

Federal statute defines the veteran’s responsibility in
seeking a service-connected disability compensation claim:
“Except as otherwise provided by law, a [veteran] has the
responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits . . . .”51
Under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, VA is
obligated to “make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in
obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant’s
claim for a benefit.”52 This obligation is known as VA’s duty to
App. 119, 125 (1999))). The fourth and fifth elements as identified here are not really about
eligibility to disability compensation, but rather how to assess the disability once the three
eligibility criteria are satisfied.
45 Disability Compensation, supra note 27.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See discussion infra Section I.B.
51 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (2012).
52 Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 3(a), 114
Stat. 2096, 2097 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5103A). Perhaps not surprisingly,
there is no one place military records are kept. The NPRC explains that “[t]he Official
Military Personnel Files (OMPF) . . . are administrative records containing information
about the subject’s military service history. Many OMPFs contain both personnel and
former active duty health records, but the service branches discontinued retiring the
health record portion to the NPRC in the 1990s.” Veterans’ Medical and Health Records, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/veterans/military-service-records/medical-records.html
[https://perma.cc/ESW6-3C8T]. There was a period of time when all services retired health
records with VA, but that stopped in 2014. Id. The National Archives has a chart on its
website to help determine where a medical record is housed, based on branch of service, status
of service termination, and date. Id.
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assist. By regulation, a veteran’s claim must be evaluated “on
the basis of the places, types and circumstances of his service as
shown by service records, the official history of each organization
in which he served, his medical records and all pertinent medical
and lay evidence.”53 Furthermore, and consistent with this duty
to assist, a veteran’s claim must be fully developed before VA
makes a decision.54
1. VA’s Duty to Assist in Obtaining Records
Typically, medical records are part of the basis for
establishing a claim for service-connected disability
compensation, and service medical records are the standard
source of evidence to establish an in-service event or condition.55
In addition to a medical opinion connecting a veteran’s current
condition to the in-service event, service medical records can
satisfy the second and third elements of a service-connected
disability claim: the event or incident that gave rise to a
disability or disease and the nexus between service and the
disability or disease. Although there is no statutory requirement
that service medical records are provided in support of these two
elements, VA does require medical records or medical opinions
to show the relationship between service and disability or
disease.56 These records can be difficult to obtain from the
civilian healthcare sector, as many healthcare providers are
unable or unwilling to opine as to a nexus between a service
disability that may have occurred decades ago, and a current
disability.57 VA recognizes the importance of service records,
noting: “Service records are critical to determining a claimant’s
entitlement to VA benefits.”58
38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2017).
38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (“Decisions of the Board shall be based on the entire
record in the proceeding and upon consideration of all evidence and material of record
and applicable provisions of law and regulation.”); McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“VA is required to assist the veteran claimant with fully developing a
record before making a decision on the veteran’s claim. This fully developed record then
forms the basis of a Board decision.”).
55 See Evidence Requirements, supra note 7.
56 Disability Compensation, supra note 27.
57 See James D. Ridgway, Lessons the Veterans Benefits System Must Learn on
Gathering Expert Witness Evidence, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 423 (2009) (“[T]he fundamental
problem with private medical opinions is that they tend to lack detail because the doctors are
not aware of the relevant legal standards or of all the information that should be included.”).
58 M21-1, Part III, Subpart iii, Chapter 2, Section A—General Information on Service
Records, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (last updated 2013), https://www.knowva.eben
efits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/en-US/portal/55440
0000001018/content/554400000014117/M21-1-Part-III-Subpart-ii-Chapter-2-Section-ADepartment-of-Veterans-Affairs-VA-Benefit-Programs?query=M21-1,%20Part%20III,%
20Subpart%20ii,%20Chapter%202,%20Section%20A [https://perma.cc/687Y-B6LT].
53
54
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Given the uniquely pro-veteran adjudication scheme,
Congress requires VA to help veterans in obtaining relevant
records.59 This “duty to assist begins when VA receives a
complete or substantially complete application.”60 This duty
extends to records “not in the custody of a Federal department
or agency”61 as well as those “in the custody of a Federal
department or agency.”62 For example, in a disability
compensation claim, VA is obligated to obtain the veteran’s
service medical records, relevant medical records from VA
Medical Centers, and any private medical records as identified
by the veteran.63 The veteran “must provide enough information
to identify and locate the existing records.”64
This duty to assist is not boundless. VA’s efforts are
exhausted “if VA concludes that the records sought do not exist
or that further efforts to obtain those records would be futile.”65
When records are not found, VA has a duty to document the
unavailability, notify the veteran of which records were
unobtainable, explain what VA did to try to get the records, and
explain what further action (if any) VA will take.66 This further
action may include deciding the claim on the incomplete record
“unless the [veteran] submits the records VA was unable to
obtain.”67 VA is also obligated to notify the veteran that he or she
“is ultimately responsible for providing the evidence.”68
In accordance with the statutory limit on VA’s duty to
assist, VA’s manual of procedures for administrating
compensation benefits, known as M21-1 Adjudication
Procedures Manual (M21-1 Manual), discourages claims
processors from sending repeated requests to NPRC after
receiving a negative response.69 This procedure, therefore, sets a
limit on the scope of VA’s duty to assist in efforts to obtain
service medical records. The M21-1 Manual notes that if NPRC
See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
38 C.F.R. § 21.33(a) (2017); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2012).
61 38 C.F.R. § 21.33(b). For example, VA must make “reasonable efforts to
obtain relevant records” from “[c]urrent or former employers” and records from “[p]rivate
medical care providers.” Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 21.1032 (b)(1).
62 38 C.F.R. § 21.33(c).
63 Id. § 21.33(b)–(c).
64 Id. § 21.33(c)(3).
65 Id. § 21.33(c)(2). In the case where VA determines it is unable to obtain
records, VA then has the duty to notify the veteran and, among other required
information, explain “the efforts VA made to obtain the records.” Id. § 21.33(e)(4); see 38
U.S.C. §§ 5102(b), 5103(a), 5103A.
66 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(e)(1)(i)–(iii).
67 Id. § 3.159(e)(iii).
68 Id. § 3.159(e)(iv); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b)(2).
69 M21-1, Part III, Subpart iii, Chapter 2, Section A—General Information on
Service Records, supra note 58.
59
60
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eventually locates the record—“which rarely occurs”—NPRC
will send the record to the appropriate VA office.70 The M21-1
Manual discourages repeated requests to NPRC because those
subsequent requests only increase the workload at NPRC and
detract from the activities of those who are attempting to locate
records that do, indeed, exist.71
By its original design, VA’s service-connected disability
compensation process was an internal program that considered
and awarded disability claims.72 The compensation system
existed “completely insulated from judicial review.”73 The system
“was not designed to decide claims subject to federal court review
and the growing body of court-made law that exists today.”74 The
Federal Circuit has recognized the pro-claimant nature of the
duty to assist as it relates to the statutory requirement for fully
developed claims before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA).75
The court explained that BVA is obligated “to ‘fully and
sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to its optimum
before deciding it on the merits.’”76 Consistent with the
obligation to develop the claim is the implicit requirement that
BVA must have the full scope of evidence to make an accurate
decision.77
2. A Veteran’s “As Likely As Not” Burden of Proof
VA adjudicates claims for service-connected disability
compensation within a non-adversarial process implemented by
VA regional offices. Critically, within this pro-veteran
adjudication system, the evidentiary standard gives the “benefit
of the doubt” to the veteran.78 Consistent with the statutory
benefit of the doubt given to the veteran, a veteran “need only
Id.
Id.
72 Daniel L. Nagin, The Credibility Trap: Notes on a VA Evidentiary Standard,
45 U. MEM. L. REV. 887, 888 (2015).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
76 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. 100-963, at 13 (1988), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5795).
77 There’s a nagging due process issue here, as well. How can due process be
satisfied in a system that allows a decision on an incomplete—and thus, inaccurate—
record? Surely the loss of rights every servicemember experiences upon entering service
does not extend to loss of basic constitutional rights as a veteran. This particular issue
is outside the scope of this paper.
78 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012) (“The Secretary shall consider all information and
lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits
under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of
positive and negative evidence regarding any issue to the determination of a matter, the
Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the [veteran].”).
70
71
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demonstrate that there is an ‘approximate balance of positive and
negative evidence’ in order to prevail . . . . In other words, . . . the
preponderance of the evidence must be against the claim for
benefits to be denied.”79 Further, a reasonable doubt must be
resolved in the veteran’s favor.80 This standard is known “as the ‘as
likely as not’ standard” among practitioners.81 In line with the
favorable standard, there are statutory and regulatory
presumptions where the veteran has no burden of proof to
establish service connection.
3. Service-Connection Presumptions
Congress has authorized numerous presumptions
modifying the evidentiary requirements for establishing service
connection:
geographicalor
conflict-based
wartime,82
peacetime,83 and prisoner of war.84 These presumptions are
veteran-friendly, intended to acknowledge various conditions of
service and award disability compensation without the standard
evidentiary obligations. The presumptions are either absolute or
rebuttable, setting forth a spectrum of evidentiary standards.
Importantly, presumptions have evidentiary value, but they are
not evidence.85 Rather, when the facts surrounding the veteran’s
Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54 (1990); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2017).
38 C.F.R. § 3.102.
81 Simcox, supra note 13, at 145 (quoting Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54).
82 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(4), 3.308(b) (tropical diseases); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.309(d),
3.311 (diseases resulting from radiation exposure); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (diseases
associated with exposure to herbicide agent); 38 C.F.R. § 3.317 (disabilities due to
undiagnosed illness and medically unexplained chronic multi-symptom illness as defined
by regulation). The VA website on the Disability Compensation page lists the following
as “Presumed Disability.”
79
80

•

Former prisoners of war

•

Veterans who have certain chronic or tropical diseases that become
evident within a specific period of time after discharge from service

•

Veterans who were exposed to ionizing radiation, mustard gas, or
Lewisite while in service

•

Veterans who were exposed to certain herbicides, such as by serving
in Vietnam

•

Veterans who served in Southwest Asia during the Gulf War

Disability Compensation, supra note 27.
83 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(4), 3.308(b), 3.309(b) (peacetime service on or after January
1, 1947, limited tropical disease presumption, and presumptions for chronic diseases).
84 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (presumption for various diseases).
85 Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also M21-1, Part III,
Subpart iv, Chapter 5, Section A—Principles of Reviewing Evidence and Decision Making,
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (last updated 2017), https://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov/
system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/en-US/portal/554400000001018/
content/554400000014203/M21-1-Part-III-Subpart-iv-Chapter-5-Section-A-Principles-of-Rev
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in-service injury or illness show the presumption is satisfied, the
presumption itself substitutes for evidence to satisfy the element
of service connection.86 These presumptions also explicitly
support a decision-making process with incomplete information,
but only with favorable results to the veteran. Two wellestablished presumptions include wartime presumptions and
peacetime presumptions. Both illustrate the uniquely proclaimant nature of the adjudication process and demonstrate
that the system is amenable to creating presumptions.
The wartime presumptions are absolute presumptions
for diseases and disabilities “notwithstanding there is no record
of evidence of such disease during the period of service.”87
According to 38 U.S.C. § 1112, there are forty-five diseases that
require no evidence of disease during wartime service.88 Section
1116 identifies eight diseases related to exposure to herbicides and
service in Vietnam89 and Section 1118 sets forth presumptive
service connection for service during the Persian Gulf War within
“the Southwest Asia theater of operations.”90 In these contexts, a
veteran’s presence in a geographical area during a conflict is
sufficient to establish service connection given the well-established
disease or injury associated with that area during a conflict.
The presumptions for “peacetime disability compensation”
are less strong than the wartime disability compensation
presumptions. The peacetime presumptions, however, do set forth
a relaxed evidentiary burden. Section 1133 establishes a
presumption for service connection to “a tropical disease or a
resultant disorder or disease” due to treatment or preventive care
of a tropical disease.91 The presumption of service connection
requires only that the disease or disorder is “shown to exist
within one year after separation from active service” or other
incubation period that supports the connection.92
Most recently, VA created a presumption for claims
related to exposure to contaminated water at Camp Lejeune.93
iewing-Evidence-and-Decision-Making?query=m21-1%20part%20iii%20subpart%20iv%20
chapter%205%20section%20a%20principles%20of%20reviewing%20evidence%20and%20
decision%20making [https://perma.cc/5ABP-46MM].
86 Routen, 142 F.3d at 1440; see also M21-1, Part III, Subpart iv, Chapter 5,
Section A—Principles of Reviewing Evidence and Decision Making, supra note 85.
87 38 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (2012).
88 Id.
89 38 U.S.C. § 1116.
90 38 U.S.C. § 1118(a)(3).
91 38 U.S.C. § 1133(a).
92 Id.
93 “From the 1950s through the 1980s, people living or working at the U.S. Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were potentially exposed to drinking water
contaminated with industrial solvents, benzene, and other chemicals.” Public Health, U.S.
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This new rule took effect March 14, 2017, amending 38 C.F.R.
section 3.307 to include presumptive service connection for
“disease associated with the contaminants in the water supply at
Camp Lejeune.”94 For veterans “who served at Camp Lejeune for
no less than 30 days (consecutive or nonconsecutive)” between
August 1, 1953, to December 31, 1987, in the absence of
“affirmative evidence to establish that the individual was not
exposed to contaminants in the water supply during that service,”
the veteran “shall be presumed to have been exposed to
contaminants in the water supply.”95
At the opposite end of presumptions favoring the
existence of injury or disease, there is a presumption of sound
condition that applies to both wartime and peacetime disability
compensation.96 This presumption assumes that a veteran was
of sound condition at the time she entered service. This
presumption, unlike the other presumptions, articulates how it
may be rebutted by the Secretary.97 To satisfactorily rebut the
presumption of sound condition, the clear and unmistakable
evidence must demonstrate “that an injury or disease existed
prior thereto and was not aggravated by such service.”98 Only if
the government can provide “clear and unmistakable evidence of
both a preexisting condition and a lack of in-service aggravation”
can the presumption of soundness be rebutted.99 Clear and
unmistakable is a high burden of proof, more stringent than the
clear and convincing evidence standard.100 Thus, this presumption
strongly favors the veteran and falls in line with the veteranfriendly, non-adversarial nature of the claims process.
These various presumptions reflect VA’s pro-veteran
stance as far as removing the burden of proof when there is no
question that the veteran’s service establishes one or more of the
required elements for a disability compensation claim. In
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/camp-lejeune/
[https://perma.cc/8A3R-L5J2]; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(7) (including presumptive service
connection for “[d]iseases associated with exposure to contaminants in the water supply at
Camp Lejeune”). For the proposed rule, see 81 Fed. Reg. 62419 (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-09-09/pdf/2016-21455.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BTA63TG]; see also Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-54, § 102(b)(1), 126 Stat. 1165, 1168 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.
§ 1787).
94 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a), (a)(7) (2017).
95 Id.; see also 82 Fed. Reg. 4173 (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2017-01-13/pdf/2017-00499.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3GW-NGUV].
96 38 U.S.C. § 1111.
97 Id.
98 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b); 70 Fed. Reg. 23027 (May 4, 2005).
99 Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing
legislative history of 38 U.S.C. § 1111 in the context of wartime service).
100 See Vanerson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 254, 258–59 (1999).
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addition to these presumptions, there are two other relevant
evidentiary considerations to discuss.
4. Relaxed Evidentiary Burden for Records Destroyed
in the 1973 Fire
Beyond the presumptions that remove the veteran’s
evidentiary burdens, VA has also recognized a need for a relaxed
evidentiary burden in cases where a veteran’s records were
destroyed by the 1973 fire.101 This relaxed evidentiary burden
differs from the previously discussed presumptions since it is not
statutory and not a presumption.102
Further, VA responded to the predicament veterans face
in establishing a claim for service-connected disability
compensation when their records are among the millions of
records destroyed by the fire103 by creating procedures for
reconstructing these records. VA’s procedure for reconstructing
records starts when the veteran files NA Form 13055, Request
for Information Needed to Reconstruct Medical Data, as part of
a claim for disability compensation.104 Based on the information
provided, VA requests “NPRC to reconstruct any applicable
records.”105 As with the statutory rebuttable presumptions, VA
reviews the evidence more favorably to veterans in this
situation. As stated on the VA website, VA does “not rely only on
the service treatment records when deciding claims for cases
that are related to the 1973 fire. [The veteran] can provide or
request [VA] to obtain supplemental records.”106 VA will “accept
photocopies of any service treatment records” the veteran
possesses as well as alternative sources of evidence.107
5. Alternative Sources of Evidence
This final consideration for evidentiary burdens
recognizes that sometimes service medical records are just not
101 See Veteran Records Destroyed by Fire in 1973, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://
www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/NPRC1973Fire.asp [https://perma.cc/L48X-CT2H].
102 Id.; see also The 1973 Fire, National Personnel Records Center, NAT’L ARCHIVES
AT ST. LOUIS, https://www.archives.gov/st-louis/military-personnel/fire-1973.html [https://
perma.cc/N5T9-UYE8].
103 Veterans’ FAQ, supra note 20 (“Archival Records, FAQ: . . . Was my record
destroyed in the 1973 Fire? If so, what information is available to me?”).
104 Veteran Records Destroyed by Fire in 1973, supra note 101; see also M21-1,
Part III, Subpart iii, Chapter 2, Section E—Unique Claims and Situations That Require
Special Handling, supra note 18.
105 Veteran Records Destroyed by Fire in 1973, supra note 101.
106 Id.
107 Id.; see infra Section I.B.5.
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available for consideration. Even though “medical evidence is
almost always needed to” establish the requisite nexus between
the current disability and an in-service event or injury,108 VA has
determined that alternative evidence may be submitted to try to
establish service connection. This is because lack of service
medical records or medical opinions is not supposed to be an
automatic bar to establishing a relationship between service and
a disability or disease. According to federal statute, VA must
consider “the places, types, and circumstances of such veteran’s
service as shown by such veteran’s service record, the official
history of each organization in which such veteran served, such
veteran’s medical records, and all pertinent medical and lay
evidence.”109 There are a number of recognized types of evidence
that can be submitted in addition to or in place of service medical
records to meet the nexus requirement.110 As long as there is
competent evidence to establish service connection, medical or lay
evidence may be presented to meet the veteran’s initial burden.111
The M21-1 Manual identifies the types of alternative
evidence a veteran may use to supplement or as a substitute for
service treatment records:
•

statements from service medical personnel

•

certified “buddy” statements or affidavits

•

accident and police reports

•

employment-related examination reports

•

medical evidence from civilian/private hospitals, clinics, and
physicians that treated the Veteran during service or shortly
after separation

•

letters written during service

•

photographs taken during service

•

pharmacy prescription records, and/or

•

insurance-related examination reports.112

Unlike the presumptions, these alternative sources of
evidence are no guarantee of sufficiency to establish service
108 BARTON F. STICHMAN ET AL., VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL 128 (2014);
Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
109 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2012).
110 M21-1, Part III, Subpart iii, Chapter 2, Section E—Unique Claims and
Situations That Require Special Handling, supra note 18. (“III.iii.2.E.2.b. Types of
Evidence VA May Use to Supplement or as a Substitute for STRs.”).
111 Id.
112 Id.
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connection. Instead, the alternatives are evaluated for credibility,
competency, and consistency with other evidence.113 VA is obligated
to consider “all pertinent medical and lay evidence”114 in evaluating
a claim and at the administrative appeal level, the BVA has a
heightened obligation “to evaluate and discuss all of the evidence
that may be favorable to the appellant” when a veteran’s service
medical records have been “lost or destroyed.”115 A veteran may
be able to overcome a lack of records by statutory presumption.
For example, when a combat veteran’s records were destroyed
while in the government’s care, resulting in no medical records
of the veteran’s medical status at the time he left service, the
veteran is able to rely on the presumption given to veterans in
combat.116 The veteran’s assertion that his trench feet condition
is related to his service is enough to establish service connection
because trench feet is a condition consistent with engaging in
combat, and he thus benefits from the combat statutory
presumption.117 But for a veteran with no records and no
applicable presumption, such a claim would likely be denied due
to lack of evidence.
II.

NO RECORDS, NO SERVICE CONNECTION, NO BENEFITS

Despite the explicitly pro-veteran construct of disability
claims adjudication and the uniquely pro-veteran duties and
evidentiary principles, veterans typically face an insurmountable
burden in cases where service medical records have been lost or
destroyed. During claims adjudication, VA may reject
alternative evidence because the events established by the
alternative evidence are “not reflected in the service record.”118
This rejection of alternative evidence is typically upheld
on appeal, even in cases involving the 1973 fire where a
procedurally relaxed evidentiary standard exists. Inexplicably,
the Federal Circuit rejected an argument “that the destruction of
records while in the government’s custody should result in a

113 M21-1, Part III, Subpart iv, Chapter 5, Section A—Principles of Reviewing
Evidence and Decision Making, supra note 85 (defining various evidentiary concepts and
setting forth procedures for applying the evidentiary concepts in evaluating claims).
114 38 U.S.C. 1154(a).
115 Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 370–71 (2005); Ussery v. Brown,
8 Vet. App. 64, 68 (1995); Moore v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 401, 406 (1991).
116 Moore, 1 Vet. App. at 405.
117 Id. (applying 38 U.S.C. § 354(b) (1988), 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(d), 3.102 (last
sentence) (1990)).
118 Wading Through Warehouses of Paper, supra note 19, at 32–34 (prepared
statement of Richard Dumancas, Deputy Director for Claims, the American Legion)
(quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1154).
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relaxed evidentiary standard for veterans.”119 Despite the
government’s arguments, there is a relaxed evidentiary standard
and process in place for records lost or damaged by the 1973 fire.
With this in mind, there seems little hope for veterans such as
McMullan whose records are lost in some other way but still lost
at no fault of the veteran.
Ultimately, the idea of a presumption for service
connection in the absence of service medical records has been
rejected either implicitly or explicitly from the early stage of
agency decision-making all the way to the Federal Circuit.
Together these rejections can be categorized into four purported
reasons for rejecting a presumption in the face of lost or
destroyed records. Before considering those four reasons, it is
helpful to place the reasons in context of two Federal Circuit
cases involving lost records.
A.

The Federal Circuit’s Rejection of an Adverse
Presumption

After a typically arduous and lengthy administrative
process that results in VA denying a veteran’s claims, and
unsuccessful appeals to the BVA and CAVC, the veteran may
appeal outside of the veteran-only tribunals to the Federal
Circuit. The panel at the Federal Circuit is not obligated to help
the veteran develop his claim, but rather appears to take an
actively adversarial approach toward veterans. At best, this
approach would be neutral, but the practical effect
disadvantages the veteran in the judicial process. This seems
especially true in cases involving records lost or destroyed by the
1973 fire.
In two cases involving records lost in the 1973 fire,
veterans argued for an adverse presumption against the
government.120 The Federal Circuit explicitly rejected arguments
Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. (“To the extent that Jandreau seeks to invoke traditional evidentiary
adverse inference rules, we find those rules to be inapplicable, even if we were to agree
that they apply in the context of VA proceedings.”); Brief of Claimant-Appellant Alva
Jandreau at 14, Jandreau, 492 F.3d 1372 (No. 2007-7029), 2007 WL 460170 (“The effect
of a loss [of records due to no fault of the veteran] should be that the [veteran’s] burden
of proof is relaxed.”); Cromer v. Nicholson, 455 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“[Cromer] argues that once negligent destruction is presumed, an adverse presumption
of service connection should be imposed against the government.”); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Cromer v. Nicholson, No. 06-1261 (2007) 2007 WL 868959 [hereinafter
Petition for Writ of Certiorari]; Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 24, Cromer, 455
F.3d 1346 (No. 05-7172), 2005 WL 2802527 (“[P]lacing the burden on the VA to disprove
the alleged occurrence of appellant’s in-service incident is in keeping with the overall
paternalistic framework of the VA system.”) (citations omitted).
119
120
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for an adverse presumption.121 It also refused to acknowledge the
hypocrisy of the existing procedural allowance for lay evidence
to replace service medical records when the reality is that lay
evidence is typically rejected as incompetent as a medical
diagnosis.122 In responding to arguments for new presumptions
in favor of veterans, the court looked only to existing VA law and
regulations and did not entertain the application of a rule from
another field of law or creation of a new rule. In finding that VA
and Congress have not “specifically shifted” the veteran’s
“evidentiary burden of establishing [a] claim in veterans’
benefits cases,” the court rested its rejection of a presumption on
those agency and congressional decisions not to do so.123
In deciding these cases, the Federal Circuit took a strictly
statutory-based approach to reject the veterans’ claims for
disability compensation, reasoning that because Congress
created a number of presumptions and because it did not create
a presumption in cases of records lost or destroyed by the fire,
the court could not recognize such a presumption.124 In essence,
the court punted the matter to Congress, relying on the
assumption that Congress would necessarily craft presumptions
wherever appropriate just because it had done so in some
circumstances.125
Furthermore, even though there was alternative medical
evidence presented in those cases, the lack of service medical
records still stood in the way of favorable benefits decisions. In
Cromer v. Nicholson, the court identified the existing VA
framework including the procedures for handling cases
involving the 1973 fire and the BVA’s “heightened duty to
explain its findings” in cases involving alternate sources of
evidence, but said nothing about how this framework fell short
in that particular case.126 Instead, the court settled on the lack
of an adverse presumption of service connection within the
Cromer, 455 F.3d at 1350–51.
Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1375–77; see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d
1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The Veterans Court erred by affirming the Board’s
erroneous statutory and regulatory interpretation that lay evidence cannot be credible
absent confirmatory clinical records to substantiate the facts described in that lay evidence.”);
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 120, at *9 (“[I]t is a cruel distortion of logic
to read a Congressional intent to eliminate the adverse presumption from the paternalistic,
pro-claimant VA system, while under a similar legislative scheme, the same common law
principle flourishes in civil and other administrative fields.”).
123 Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1375.
124 Cromer, 455 F.3d at 1351 (“In the absence of a statutory or constitutional
imperative, it would be improper for this court to impose a judicial remedy to supplant
or supplement the remedies and procedures already provided by Congress and the VA.”).
125 Id.
126 Id.
121

122
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existing framework as reflecting VA’s affirmative rejection of
such a presumption.127 The inconsistency of the pro-veteran
claims process that recognizes a presumption in the case of
records lost or destroyed by fire but not those lost or destroyed
by other causes, accompanied by the hardline taken by the
Federal Circuit to reject any additional presumptions means
that every instance of lost or destroyed evidence may translate
to a presumption against service connection. Not only is such a
presumption in direct conflict with the pro-veteran system, but
the presumption is not even rebuttable, and it leaves veterans
with no recourse.
A presumption favoring the veteran would refrain from
holding the lost records against the veteran in proving his claim—
and set up a reasonable standard for measuring whatever evidence
does exist, including favorable evaluation of alternative evidence
offered in place of the lost or destroyed records.
B.

Purported Reasons for Rejecting an Adverse
Presumption

Without VA or congressional action, there is little chance
for an adverse presumption to gain traction given both the
Federal Circuit’s explicit rejection of it, as well as the way claims
without records are treated during the administrative process.
Four purported reasons for rejecting an adverse presumption in
the current statutory and regulatory scheme emerge after
weaving the various decisionmakers’ rationales together to get
the full sense of the bar to an adverse presumption in the cases
of lost or destroyed service medical records.
First, there is no explicit exception recognized by the law.
Because a veteran has a statutory responsibility “to present and
support a [benefits] claim” under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a), there is a
conflict in applying an adverse presumption as a replacement for
presenting evidence.128 Even more problematic to the court is
that there are express exceptions to section 5107(a) where
Congress “deemed a shift in the burden of proof to be necessary
or just,” but made no such express exception for records lost or
destroyed while in the government’s possession.129 This is
because of an erroneous assumption that congressional action is
the sole mechanism for responding to lost or destroyed records.

127
128
129

Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1375 (explaining its own decision in Cromer).
Cromer, 455 F.3d at 1350–51.
Id.
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Second, the principle of adverse presumption is rooted in
negligence and common law bailment; any presumption would
thus require proof of the government’s negligence. The Federal
Circuit discussed common law bailment in Cromer and noted
that the law in Missouri—where the fire occurred—places the
“burden of showing bailee’s negligence” on the bailor.130 The
court recognized that even though “the government’s custody of
its own records is not a bailment in the classic sense, . . . the
common-law rule is instructive in these circumstances.”131 The
court also explained that Cromer did not offer any decision “in
which an adverse presumption or inference was drawn in the
absence of bad faith or, at a minimum, negligence.”132 And thus,
the court declined to “create a new rule” given the existing
procedures intended to directly address the fire merely because
Cromer found those procedures inadequate.133 For similar
reasons, the court explained in Jandreau v. Nicholson, an
adverse inference is also inappropriate in the veterans’ claims
context because an adverse inference requires destruction “with a
culpable state of mind,” and the court noted the absence of a “claim
here that the records were willfully or recklessly destroyed.”134
Without entertaining the possibility that the particular
circumstances surrounding a veteran’s lost or destroyed medical
records could justify an application of the general adverse
presumption rule, this reason ignores the justification of using a
similar rule even without negligence given the non-adversarial
nature of veterans’ disability compensation law.
Third, as long as VA fulfills its statutory duty to assist
veteran claimants, the absence of records cannot be used as an
adverse presumption against the government. That VA makes
an effort to “seek[ ] and obtain[ ] alternative medical records to
supplant the records apparently destroyed in the 1973 fire” is
sufficient, even when no alternative medical records exist.135
Given the low likelihood of a veteran having both military or VA
health records and private medical records covering the same
time period, the use of alternative medical records is unlikely to
Id. at 1350 n.2.
Id.
132 Id. at 1351.
133 Id.
134 Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
Residential Funding Corp. v. De-George Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002)). The
court acknowledged that there are cases where negligence creates an adverse inference,
and cases where negligence is insufficient, but it avoided the question of negligence here
by pointing out that “Jandreau conceded at oral argument that there was no evidence of
government negligence leading to the destruction of the records.” Id. at 1376.
135 Cromer, 455 F.3d at 1351.
130

131
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solve the problem of the fire’s destruction of millions of records.
Even so, requiring VA to do more or to treat the VA’s
unproductive search as an adverse presumption “would amount
to a judicial amendment of the statutory duty to assist—a
measure beyond the power of this court.”136 As with the rejection
of an adverse presumption, this reason ignores the nonadversarial nature of the claims process as well as rejects an
opportunity to fill in a regulatory or congressional gap.
Fourth, given the highly regulated process for disability
compensation claims, a judicial remedy is improper. Related to
VA’s statutory duty to assist veteran claimants, there are
specific procedures in place “precisely to ease the evidentiary
burdens faced by veterans whose records were lost in the 1973
fire.”137 In particular, VA is required to help the veteran by
“obtaining [medical] evidence from alternate or collateral
sources” including the specific list of alternative or secondary
evidence.138 Beyond those obligations, a BVA decision rejecting a
claim in a case of lost records “has a heightened duty” of
explanation.139 In light of these various constructs for handling lost
records, “it would be improper . . . to impose a judicial remedy to
supplant or supplement the remedies and procedures already
provided by Congress and the VA.”140 There may be some
legitimacy to avoiding a judicial remedy, but in the face of no
alternatives available to veterans in the current statutory and
regulatory schemes, the courts should step in to assist the veteran.
With no way for a veteran to overcome the various
reasons against an adverse presumption, the VA’s nonadversarial system turns the tables on the veteran by placing
the burden on the veteran in the most difficult of circumstances.
There are administrative regulations that identify alternative
forms of evidence that a veteran can rely on in the absence of
service medical records, but in practice, the regulations are not
adhered to or at least not adhered to in a way that would give a
veteran the benefit of the doubt.
To place the burden on the veteran to prove service
connection in the absence of service medical records is to act in
direct conflict with Congress’s intent to establish and maintain
Id.
Id. at 1351.
138 Id. (alteration in original); see supra Section I.B.5. In Jandreau, the court
also discussed the question of lay evidence as sufficient for medical diagnosis. Jandreau,
492 F.3d at 1376–77. That issue is outside the scope of this article but is begging for a
critical analysis of how rarely alternative forms of evidence are determined successful to
support a veteran’s claim. Id.
139 Cromer, 455 F.3d at 1351.
140 Id.
136
137
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“a beneficial non-adversarial system of veterans benefits.”141 To
be clear, this article does not equate a lack of information within
service medical records—something which very well could be
used as evidence against establishing service connection—with
a lack of information in total or in part due to unavailable service
medical records. The non-adversarial VA system “has been an
evolution of a completely ex-parte system of adjudication in
which Congress expects VA to fully and sympathetically develop
the veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the
merits.”142 Congress defined informal in this context of veterans’
benefits hearings to mean: “strict rules of evidence and procedure
are not enforced.”143 Yet, in rejecting a relaxed evidentiary
standard and placing the burden on the veteran, VA rating
officials, the Federal Circuit, and decisionmakers in between have
essentially upheld VA decisions on the merits—when those
“merits” are incomplete due to no fault of the veteran.
In some ways, a decision that characterizes a lack of
evidence as the same as negative evidence is the essence of the
traditional adversarial system, forcing a party to provide proof
to certain standards. For example, even to move past the initial
pleadings stage, a plaintiff must assert enough to state a
claim.144 In the world of veterans’ benefits claims, however, that
is not the standard; VA is obligated to help veterans develop
claims, including helping to identify additional benefits a
veteran might be eligible for, even when the veteran did not
specifically mention such benefits in his claim.145 VA’s obligation
to identify disability claims missing from an original claim is
inconsistent with a system that offers no leeway in VA’s
evaluation of a claim involving lost or destroyed records. This
inconsistency should be resolved in line with the favorable, nonadversarial nature of veterans’ disability claims. Yet, as we see
in returning to McMullan’s story, the inconsistency is held
against the veteran rather than resolved in his favor.

H.R. Rep. 100-963, at 13 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5795.
Id. at 13, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5795.
143 Id. at 14, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5796.
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); 12(b)(6).
145 See e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (2017) (“It is the established policy of the
Department of Veterans Affairs that all veterans who are unable to secure and follow a
substantially gainful occupation by reason of service-connected disabilities shall be rated
totally disabled.”).
141

142
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McMullan’s Claim: A Presumption Against Service
Connection

McMullan had the burden to establish his claim in
seeking disability compensation benefits for hypertension he
developed back in the 1970s. Specifically, he needed to show a
current disability, an in-service event or injury, and a nexus
between the current disability and that in-service event or
injury. In early 1993, McMullan gave up on his claim without
ever receiving his records. Over a decade later, McMullan again
sought disability compensation benefits for hypertension with
assistance from various groups.146 Again, receiving no positive
response from multiple records requests, VA requested
additional information including service medical records. This
time, though, VA also listed various alternative documents “that
can substitute for service treatment records,” such as buddy
statements147 or statements from family members who witnessed
the effects of the veteran’s hypertension.148 McMullan submitted
several alternative documents including medical records from
the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Department of Corrections
(DOC), specifically noting McMullan’s hypertension. Those
records were dated October 25, 1989, and the physician noted:
“[McMullan] was first diagnosed in the DOC with hypertension
on or about 25Oct89. I have no knowledge of his condition prior
to that time. Since 10/25/89 he has been treated with
[medication] daily. Since the beginning of the regime, his
hypertension has been well controlled.”149
In that same letter noting the alternative documents
McMullan could substitute for service medical records, VA
informed McMullan that NPRC was unable to locate his service
medical records.150 McMullan then again personally requested
his records and in response to that request, the NPRC informed
him that his “medical record has been loaned to the Department

146 See, e.g., Letter from McMullan to Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Roanoke Reg’l
Office, C-file at 231, 233 (July 23, 2007) (on file with author) (marked received by
Roanoke VA Regional Office July 25, 2007); Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, VA Form 21-526,
Part B: Compensation, C-file 253–54 (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with author) (marked
received by Roanoke VA Regional Office Nov. 5, 2007).
147 Letter from Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Roanoke Reg’l Office, C-file at 329
(July 2, 2008) [hereinafter Roanoke Reg’l Office Letter] (on file with author); see also
Fully Developed Claims, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.benefits.va.gov/fdc/
index.asp [https:// perma.cc/NF7E-BS9Q] (defining “buddy statements” as “letters from
friends or those you served with that tell us about the facts of your claim”).
148 Roanoke Reg’l Office Letter, supra note 147.
149 Patient Progress Notes, C-file at 372 (Nov. 13, 1990) (on file with author).
150 Roanoke Reg’l Office Letter, supra note 147.
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of Veterans Affairs”—even though according to the most recent
letter from VA, NPRC was unable to find his records.151
Once again, without McMullan’s service medical records,
VA issued a rating decision by letter on October 2, 2008,
rejecting McMullan’s request to revise its earlier decision.152 In
part, the “decision was based on the fact that we did not have
your service treatment records.”153 According to the letter, there
was no evidence to indicate that McMullan was first treated for
hypertension in December 1977. Instead, “the earliest evidence
of treatment came from Dr. Michael Gafney. Treatment records
from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Corrections
showed that you were being treated for hypertension. The letter
from Dr. Michael Gafney and treatment records [from] the
Virginia Department of Corrections did not show a link between
your military service and hypertension.”154
In that same rating decision, VA noted that it “received
notification that the [service treatment] records had been found,
however, [VA has] not received your service treatment
records.”155 And then just three weeks later, the NPRC explained
that it had
been unable to locate the record needed to answer your request. The
military record was removed from the file area in order to respond to
a prior inquiry. Although we have conducted an extensive search, we
have not been able to locate the record. Please be assured that we will
continue to do all that is possible to locate the information you
requested. The file area has been marked and upon locating the
record, a copy will be furnished to you as expeditiously as possible.156

McMullan continued seeking help, including congressional
assistance and additional medical care.157 In April 2009, McMullan
saw a VA doctor, and that doctor noted in his records that McMullan
has hypertension currently treated with [medications]. He also carries
a statement from 11-13-1990 stating that he was hypertensive at least
since October 1989. There are no records indicating his hypertension
status prior to that date. However, based on statistical probabilities,
it is likely that [the veteran] was hypertensive for several years prior
151 Letter from Nat’l Pers. Records Ctr., C-file at 342 (July 28, 2008) (on file
with author); Roanoke Reg’l Office Letter, supra note 147.
152 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Roanoke Reg’l Office, Rating Decision, C-file at
350–54 (Oct. 2, 2008) (on file with author).
153 Id. at 351.
154 Id. at 353.
155 Id.
156 Letter from Nat’l Pers. Records Ctr., C-file at 341 (Oct. 23, 2008) (on file with
author). There was no indication that NPRC had sent the records to VA, nor any
indication that it had found the records at some earlier point in time.
157 See, e.g., Letter from McMullan to Hon. Elijah E. Cummings & Hon. Barbara
Mikulski, C-file at 360 (Jan. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
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to 1989. I have no way to document his [blood pressure] or treatment
prior to that time.158

In August 2009, the VA again denied the hypertension
claim. In this decision, VA listed the evidence considered and
that list included a statement from McMullan’s family members159
as well as the VA physician’s notes from April 2009.160 No
explanation was provided as to how this evidence was inadequate
given the unique status of his missing service medical records.
Instead, the rating decision rejected the family’s letter as
“competent medical evidence of the disability.”161 Again relying on
the physician’s notes in the prison medical file, VA concluded that
the lack of service connection remained.162
Between 2009 and 2014, McMullan continued requesting
his service medical records and was repeatedly informed that no
one knew where his records were.163 Still without receipt of his
records, McMullan filed a new Application for Compensation
And/Or Pension in October 2012. On that form, McMullan listed
hypertension as a disability with a beginning date of February
18, 1978.164 In January 2013, VA wrote to McMullan requesting
evidence that showed service connection to hypertension with
new and material evidence.165 After more unsuccessful attempts
to find McMullan’s service medical records, VA gave up on trying
to locate McMullan’s records:
We have determined that your service treatment records (STRS) for your
U.S. Army service [date range redacted] cannot be located and therefore
are unavailable for review. All efforts to obtain the needed information

158 Letter from Dr. Vasilios Papademetriou, Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., C-file
at 369 (Apr. 30, 2009) (on file with author).
159 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Huntington Reg’l Office, Rating Decision, C-file at
565–66 (Aug. 25, 2009) (on file with author); Letter from Seven of McMullan’s Family
Members, C-file at 345 (Dec. 21, 2008) (on file with author).
160 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Huntington Reg’l Office, Rating Decision, supra note
159; Letter from Dr. Vasilios Papademetriou, Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., supra note 158.
161 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Huntington Reg’l Office, Rating Decision, supra note 159.
162 Id. at 566–67.
163 Report of General Information, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs Form 21-0820, Cfile at 430 (Nov. 19, 2009) (on file with author) (noting “Veteran called in to request copies of
all of his medical records”); Report of General Information VA Form 21-0820, C-file at 432
(Dec. 21, 2009) (on file with author) (noting “Veteran called to follow up on his request.
[V]eteran requested copies of all medical records in his claims files.”). In September 2010, VA
reported that “[t]he service records you requested are not located at our station . . . . [W]e do
not know the whereabouts of your medical records.” Letter from Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
Balt. Reg’l Office, C-file at 439 (Sept. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
164 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Veteran’s Application for Compensation And/Or
Pension VA Form 21-526, C-file at 446–51 (Oct. 26, 2012) (on file with author).
165 Letter from Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Balt. Reg’l Office, C-file at 454–57
(Jan. 15, 2013) (on file with author).
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have been exhausted, and based on these facts, we have determined that
further attempts to obtain the records would be unsuccessful.166

In August 2014, McMullan—a veteran—became
homeless, forced to live in his vehicle. At that time, he received
assistance from the Veterans of Foreign Wars Service Office in
seeking a reopening of his claim. He submitted new evidence by
way of a buddy statement dated September 18, 2014: “I also
knew [McMullan] was not able to reenlist because of [h]igh blood
pressure.”167 In response, VA issued another negative rating
decision on hypertension based on lack of evidence.168 There is no
mention of the buddy statement dated September 18, 2014, that
was stamped as received by VA on September 19, 2014—ten
days before the rating decision was issued. Thus, it appears that
the buddy statement was not considered in VA’s decision not to
reopen the hypertension claim, and VA did not explain why the
buddy statement was not considered. Even worse, with no
explanation for how his alternative evidence could be used to
substantiate his claim for benefits given the absence of his
service treatment records, this final denial left McMullan with
no path forward. In VA’s own words recorded in an internal
document: “Evidence of all written and telephonic efforts to
obtain the records is in the file. All efforts to obtain the needed

166 Letter from Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Togus Reg’l Office, C-file at 471–73
(June 28, 2014) (on file with author).
167 Letter from [Redacted], C-file at 505 (Sept. 18, 2014) (on file with author).
168 Letter from Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Togus Reg’l Office, C-file at 508–13
(Sept. 29, 2014) (on file with author). The decision letter “explains” the decision:

•

The evidence from no evidence submitted is not new and material
evidence because it was previously submitted and considered in the
rating decision of 10/08/2008.

•

The evidence from no evidence is not new and material evidence
because it does not establish a fact necessary to substantiate the
claim and does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating
the claim.

•

The claim for service connection for hypertension remains denied
because the evidence submitted is not new and material. The rating
decision dated October 8, 2008 denied service connection for
hypertension as there was no event in-service and the condition
existed after service. To date we have not received any evidence
relating to those facts.

Id. In the Rating Decision letter, VA again recognized the lack of service medical records
in explaining its denial of service connection for hypertension: “Efforts to obtain your
service treatment records from all potential sources were unsuccessful. The rating
decision dated May 21, 1992 denied service connection for hypertension as there was no
[evidence of] event in-service and the condition that existed after service. To date we
have not received any evidence relating to those facts.” Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Togus
Reg’l Office, Rating Decision, C-file at 521–25 (Sept. 29, 2014) (on file with author).
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military records have been exhausted; and any further attempts
would be futile.”169
McMullan’s story is heartbreaking, but it is not unique.
Without service medical records to substantiate service
connection, even when the lack of records is the result of
government loss or destruction, a veteran may be left with
nothing. Perhaps most significantly in terms of establishing service
connection, the timing of the claim can create insurmountable
challenges: many veterans file claims years after completing service,
and even if they are able to prove a current diagnosis, trying to
produce evidence to establish the existence of a medical condition or
a particular in-service event at a certain time—sometimes decades
prior—may be impossible.170 With this construct in mind, this article
proposes administrative and statutory remedies to relax the
evidentiary burden for establishing service connection when service
medical records are lost or destroyed.
III.

RELAXING THE BURDEN FOR ESTABLISHING SERVICE
CONNECTION WHEN RECORDS ARE LOST OR DESTROYED

Service connection is all about timing. What should be
done when the only evidence that can establish a connection
between a veteran’s current disability and his active duty service
is lost or destroyed through no fault of the veteran?
That the government loses service medical records is a
reality.171 And the loss of medical records is a reality that

169 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Rating Decision/Administrative Decision/Formal
Finding/Statement of the Case (SOC)/Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC), VA
Form 21-0961, C-file at 9 (Sept. 29, 2014) (on file with author). Later attempts to find
McMullan’s records also failed, but the National Personnel Records Center repeatedly
reported that his records were “charged out to the Department of Veterans Affairs for
the adjudication of a claim.” Letter from Nat’l Pers. Records Ctr., (Feb. 6, 2015) (on file
with author); Letter from Nat’l Pers. Records Ctr., (June 23, 2015) (on file with author).
170 James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS
L. REV. 113, 115–16 (2009).
171 See supra Section I.B.4 (discussing records destroyed by the 1973 fire).
Maybe digital recordkeeping will change that, or at least decrease the number of lost
records. Electronic health records are one of VA’s initiatives, but a recent report indicates
some concerns and delays in electronic health recordkeeping. See Valerie C. Melvin, Dir.
Information Mgmt. & Tech. Resources Issues at the U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies, Comm. on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Electronic Health Records: VA’s Efforts
Raise Concerns about Interoperability Goals and Measures, Duplication with DOD and
Future Plans (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678367.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBD3ZTCT]. For testimony about the potential benefits of digital recordkeeping, see Wading
Through Warehouses of Paper, supra note 19, at 36 (prepared statement of Michael R.
Viterna, President, National Association of Veterans Advocates) (discussing benefits of
“fewer VA personnel” handling files; fewer inquiries from veterans and veterans’
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veterans pay for, when they’ve already paid with their service,
and for many, their ongoing medical, emotional, and societal
issues.172 Since VA recognized the need to provide some sort of
response to the 1973 fire, there is precedent for allowing
alternative forms of evidence and relaxing evidentiary burdens
beyond the congressionally recognized statutory presumptions.
Given the courts’ resistance to find a remedy in the absence of a
regulation or statute, however, a judicial remedy seems at best
inefficient and at worst a total failure. Even so, I include a few
observations on a judicial remedy here.
A judicial remedy may be superfluous if both proposed
administrative and statutory remedies are also implemented. A
judicial remedy requires a recognition of the unique nature of
veterans’ benefits law. Veterans’ benefits law simply is not like any
other area of law given the non-adversarial and veteran-friendly
characteristics of veterans’ disability compensation and it should
not be a candidate for decisions made by strict analogy to other
areas of the law. Rather than use the distinctiveness of veterans’
issues as a reason to assume Congress would take action if it
wanted to, courts should look for veteran-friendly approaches to
deciding appeals, just as there is a veteran-friendly approach to
deciding claims in the administrative process.
The Federal Circuit would not have to reverse itself or
acknowledge some type of mistake by reaching a different
decision in the next case involving lost or destroyed records.
Indeed, the court could lay a foundation for how the uniqueness
of these cases requires a specialized interpretation and
application of law. The court could start with the overriding
framework of giving the benefit of the doubt to the veteran
claimant by applying a relaxed evidentiary standard. This
remedy seems unlikely, however, given the judicial branch’s
resistance thus far and for that reason, my solutions are directed
at VA and Congress.
A just remedy does not call for an automatic decision in
favor of a veteran with lost or destroyed service medical records.
representative; and ease of records access when multiple claims are being processed
simultaneously at different stages).
172 It is worth noting VA’s repeated requests for any records that are in the
veteran’s custody. There is some false assumption that veterans have copies of their
service medical records (and that they are just not including them in the claims filings).
At least anecdotally and specifically in regard to enlisted servicemembers, outprocessing can be confusing; many separating servicemembers are not particularly
focused on recordkeeping, but rather on the next step in life. Placing the burden on the
veteran to maintain the records is unrealistic and unfair. The challenges to accessing
service medical records is explicitly acknowledged by the congressional mandate for VA
to assist veterans in finding records. See supra Section I.B.1 (discussing VA’s duty to
assist in obtaining records).
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Any remedy should give veterans the benefit of the doubt, but
there should be no room for fraudulent or unfounded claims.
Instead, a responsive remedy would allow a veteran to get past
the absence of service medical records by providing alternative
sources of evidence to establish service connection. When that
evidence is enough to suggest service connection, the burden
should shift to VA to prove otherwise.
Here I offer two remedies—administrative and statutory—
to address the problems veterans face when trying to establish
service connection in the absence of service medical records due to
no fault of their own. With these remedies, there would be no need
for a judicial remedy as the courts would simply apply the new
relaxed evidentiary burden in future cases.
A.

Administrative Remedy

At the administrative stage, a simple solution would be
to extend the relaxed evidentiary burden to all claims involving
records that were lost or destroyed for any reason or no reason
at all while those records were in a government agency’s control.
Under this relaxed standard, there would be no requirement for
the veteran to prove negligence. Instead, the relaxed evidentiary
burden would take effect when VA issued a declaration that “it
is reasonably certain that such records do not exist or that
further efforts to obtain those records would be futile.”173 At that
point, VA would reevaluate the claim giving no weight—positive
or negative—to the lack of service medical records and instead
evaluate a claim based on the alternative evidence submitted by
the veteran. The alternative evidence should be evaluated in the
light most favorable to the veteran. If it is “as likely as not” from
the alternative evidence that service connection is established,
the alternative evidence should be deemed sufficient within the
relaxed evidentiary approach.
Giving the veteran the benefit of the doubt is consistent
with the non-adversarial construct of veterans’ claims law. The
alternative evidence would essentially create a rebuttable
presumption of service connection. A presumption would not be
an absolute assumption of service connection. Instead, it would
place the burden on the government to show lack of service
connection rather than rule against the veteran on a lack of
information when that lack of information is due to no fault of
the veteran. Creating the rebuttable presumption of service
connection in these limited circumstances of lost or destroyed
173

38 U.S.C. § 5103A(c)(2) (2012).
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records is consistent with VA’s obligation to help veterans
develop their claims.
1. Proposed Regulation for Relaxed Evidentiary Burden
The existing presumptions are codified within 38 C.F.R.
§§ 3.303-3.318. The following proposal for a new presumption would
be inserted as 3.319—a section currently reserved with no text.
3.319. PRESUMPTIVE SERVICE CONNECTION WHEN SERVICE
MEDICAL RECORDS ARE LOST OR DESTROYED.
(a) General. Service medical records are the preferred source of
evidence for establishing service connection, but when those records
are lost or destroyed due to no fault of the veteran, alternative
evidence must be allowed to substitute for those records even when
the alternative evidence is not as strong as a service medical record.
(b) Presumptive service connection by alternative evidence. When
service medical records are lost or destroyed, alternative forms of
evidence must be evaluated giving the benefit of the doubt to the
veteran consistent with 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.174 Alternative forms of
evidence include
(i) certified statements from the veteran-claimant
(ii) certified buddy statements or affidavits175
(iii) police or accident reports
(iv) medical evidence from private hospitals, clinics, or physicians
where the veteran received treatment during service or within 18
months from separation
(v) pharmacy prescription records
(vi) employment-related physical examinations
(vii) insurance-related physical examinations
(viii) letters written during service
(ix) photographs taken during service
(c) Establishing the presumption. To establish presumptive service
connection, at least two forms of alternative evidence must be
provided in support of a claim. Equal weight must be given to all types
174 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2017) (“The reasonable doubt doctrine is also applicable
even in the absence of official records, particularly if the basic incident allegedly arose
under combat, or similarly strenuous conditions, and is consistent with the probable
results of such known hardship.”).
175 “VA considers a buddy statement ‘credible’ if the evidence of record shows
the fellow service member served in the same unit and at the same time as the Veteran
claims he/she was injured in combat.” M21-1, Part III, Subpart iii, Chapter 2, Section
E—Unique Claims and Situations That Require Special Handling, supra note 18.
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of alternative evidence and a credibility determination may not be
made on the mere basis that the alternative evidence is
unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence.176 As long as
the alternative evidence is credible and consistent with the
circumstances, conditions, or hardships of service, the alternative
evidence shall be accepted as a presumption of service connection in
the absence of a service medical record.177
(d) Effect on other elements of a claim. This subsection has no effect
on establishing the other elements of a disability compensation claim
(e.g., medical evidence of a current disability or disease).
(e) Latent discovery of service medical records. In the rare possibility
that service medical records are located after being identified as lost
or destroyed, any claims granted or denied will be reviewed with the
new evidence considered. If the service medical record establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt a lack of service connection for a claim, all
benefits related to that claim will cease with no collection for past
payments. If the service medical record establishes service connection,
all benefits related to that claim will continue consistent with the
prior presumption of service connection.178

2. The Administrative Remedy in Action
In seeking disability compensation for hypertension and
learning that his service medical records were lost, McMullan
provided multiple forms of alternative evidence: his own
statement of reenlistment denial due to hypertension;179 a buddy
statement claiming awareness of the hypertension diagnosis;180
family members’ signed statement as to awareness of the
hypertension diagnosis;181 a physician’s note of statistical
probability that McMullan had hypertension before 1989 and
the explicit acknowledgement that it is impossible—years
later—to determine McMullan’s blood pressure prior to 1989.182
See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See 38 U.S.C. § 354(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(d), 3.102.
178 Any beneficiaries of benefits due to a presumptive service connection would
be subject to the same criminal penalties as other beneficiaries for fraudulent claims as
investigated and prosecuted by VA Office of the Inspector General. About the Office of
Investigations, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://www.va.gov/
oig/about/investigations.asp [https://perma.cc/82TC-WEU3]. Inspections into benefits
programs are a priority of the Inspector General’s office and this presumption for service
connection would likely be evaluated in the context of disability payments made or
withheld. See Nikki Wentling, Veterans Denied Millions in Benefits by VA, STARS &
STRIPES (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/10/01/veterans-deniedmillions-in-benefits-by-va.html [https://perma.cc/4JEY-G3LY].
179 Veterans Admin., Veteran’s Application for Compensation and/or Pension, VA
Form 21-526, C-file at 183 (Oct. 22, 1990) (on file with author) (describing nature and history
of disability as “turned down for reenlistment in 1978 because of high blood pressure”).
180 Letter from [Redacted], supra note 167.
181 Letter from Seven of McMullan’s Family Members, supra note 159.
182 Letter from Dr. Vasilios Papademetriou, Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., supra note 158.
176
177

510

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

Under the proposed regulatory framework, these
alternative forms of evidence would be acceptable in the absence
of his service medical records.183 The alternative evidence would
have been evaluated for credibility and consistency with
circumstances, conditions, or hardships of McMullan’s service. If
there was anything in the file to indicate the impossibility of
McMullan having hypertension in 1978, that some intervening
condition or event occurred after McMullan’s service ended, or
that McMullan’s hypertension was the result of willful
misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs, the presumption would
not be given.184 Otherwise, if the multiple consistent forms of
alternative evidence were deemed credible, McMullan would
have established a presumptive service connection. And from
there, VA would rate his disability in determining his benefits.
This approach to considering alternative evidence in the
absence of records is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
explanation of the intersection of lay evidence and service medical
records when the service medical records do not confirm the lay
evidence. In Buchanan,185 the court rejected the BVA’s decision
that “lay statements lack credibility absent confirmatory clinical
records to substantiate such recollections.”186 The court explained
that even though “the lack of contemporaneous medical records
may be a fact that the BVA can consider and weigh against a
veteran’s lay evidence, the lack of such records does not, in and
of itself, render lay evidence not credible.”187 Thus, even when
service medical records exist and are considered as part of a
claim accompanied by lay evidence to establish service
connection, “the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence
should not be an absolute bar to the veteran’s ability to prove his
claim of entitlement to disability benefits” using credible and
competent lay evidence.188
The proposed administrative approach is also consistent
with the BVA’s responsibility to assess credibility of lay
evidence. As the Federal Circuit explained in Jandreau, “[l]ay
evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of
a condition when” certain conditions are met.189 First, the layperson
See supra Section I.B.5.
See infra Section III.B.
185 Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1336.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1337.
189 Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also
Hazelett v. McDonald, No. 14-0399, 2015 WL 1537618, at *3–4 (Ct. Vet. App. Apr. 7,
2015) (explaining the requirement for the Board to consider all three ways lay evidence can
be competent). But see Jandreau v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 12, 16–18 (2009) (describing the
183

184
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must be “competent to identify the medical condition.”190 Second,
the layperson must report a contemporaneous medical diagnosis.191
And third, the layperson’s testimony about symptoms must be
consistent with a “later diagnosis by a medical professional.”192
Ideally, an administrative remedy would be sufficient to
give veterans the benefit of the doubt within the statutorilyguaranteed non-adversarial adjudication process. Given the
complexity of the claims process and potential for inconsistencies,
however, any administrative remedy in this context likely needs a
similar statutory scheme to ensure consistency in evaluating
claims without service medical records.
B.

Statutory Remedy

If a regulatory solution is too complicated given VA’s
various other priorities, congressional action may be more
efficient, and may even help to spur eventual regulatory action.
A statutory fix would also be relatively simple in terms of adding
new language to the existing statutory scheme.
1. Proposed Statutory Amendment for Relaxed
Evidentiary Burden
The relevant existing statutory section is 38 U.S.C.
§ 5103A Duty to assist claimants. Specifically, the following
proposed statutory language would be inserted after the existing
subsection (c)(2) as a new (c)(3):
(3) Whenever the Secretary has determined it is reasonably certain
that requested service medical records do not exist or that further
efforts to obtain the requested records would be futile,193 the Secretary
shall accept alternative evidence as sufficient proof194 of service
connection to any disease or injury alleged to have been incurred in or
aggravated by such service.

Federal Circuit’s decision in Jandreau and stating that “[T]he secretary correctly points
out that the Federal Circuit provided no citation of law for its discussion in Jandreau of the
circumstances where lay evidence may be competent to diagnosis (sic) certain medical
conditions” in support of the court’s rejection of Jandreau’s claim for attorney fees and
expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)).
190 Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1377.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(c)(2) (2012).
194 There is already a statutory duty for the Secretary to “give the benefit of the
doubt to the [veteran].” 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). This acceptance of alternative evidence
similarly gives the benefit of the doubt to the veteran “[w]hen there is an approximate
balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the
determination of a matter.” 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).
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(A) This presumption of service connection shall be established by
at least two forms of alternative evidence, as defined by (C), provided
in support of service connection. Equal weight must be given to all
types of alternative evidence and a credibility determination may not
be made on the mere basis that the alternative evidence is
unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence.195 As long as
the alternative evidence is credible and consistent with the
circumstances, conditions, or hardships of service, the alternative
evidence shall be accepted as a presumption of service connection in
the absence of a service medical record.196
(B) This presumption is rebuttable by clear and unmistakable
evidence197 that demonstrates (i) the impossibility of the existence and
timing of the event, injury, or disease;198 (ii) the disease or disability
was caused by a supervening condition or event that occurred after
the veteran’s service ended; or (iii) the disease or disability is the
result of the veteran’s own willful misconduct or the abuse of alcohol
or drugs.199
(C) Alternative evidence includes, but is not limited to, the
following:
(i) certified statements from the veteran-claimant
(ii) certified buddy statements or affidavits200
(iii) police or accident reports
(iv) medical evidence from private hospitals, clinics, or
physicians where the veteran received treatment during
service or within 18 months from separation
(v) pharmacy prescription records
(vi) employment-related physical examinations
(vii) insurance-related physical examinations
(viii) letters written during service
(ix) photographs taken during service201

See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.304(d) (2017) (Pensions,
Bonuses, and Veterans’ Relief Regulations).
197 Clear and unmistakable evidence, commonly called CUE, is the same
standard required to rebut the presumption of sound condition. See 38 U.S.C. § 1111.
198 If impossibility is too high a burden for the Secretary, I propose the following
alternative: (c) the Secretary proves by a preponderance of the evidence inconsistency
between the claimed event, injury, or disease, and surrounding circumstances.
199 See 38 C.F.R. § 3.301.
200 “VA considers a buddy statement ‘credible’ if the evidence of record shows
the fellow service member served in the same unit and at the same time as the Veteran
claims he/she was injured in combat.” M21-1, Part III, Subpart iii, Chapter 2, Section
E—Unique Claims and Situations That Require Special Handling, supra note 18.
201 Id.
195
196
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2. The Statutory Remedy in Action
Like the administrative remedy, the statutory remedy
sets out a presumption for service connection in the absence of
service medical records. McMullan would likely meet the
statutory standard in the same way he would meet the proposed
regulatory standard for alternative types of evidence.
Under the proposed statutory framework, the Secretary
would then have the opportunity to provide clear and unmistakable
evidence to demonstrate the impossibility of McMullan having
hypertension in 1978. If the Secretary showed that some intervening
condition or event occurred after McMullan’s service ended, the
Secretary would overcome the presumption. Or if the Secretary
proved that McMullan’s hypertension was the result of willful
misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs, the presumption would
similarly be defeated. If the Secretary was unable to produce
clear and unmistakable evidence to demonstrate the
impossibility of McMullan having hypertension in 1978, then
McMullan’s claim would survive service connection and VA
would then rate his disability to determine his benefits.
In McMullan’s case, given the impossibility of establishing
that his current diagnosis of hypertension dates back to 1978, the
Secretary would likely face the same obstacle yet in reverse: the
impossibility of proving the veteran did not have hypertension in
1978. Indeed, none of the evidence VA used to evaluate McMullan’s
claim affirmatively establishes when his hypertension began.
Thus, the Secretary would likely not satisfy (B)(i). Furthermore,
given that McMullan’s file included prison health records
acknowledging his hypertension, it is worth considering the
hypothetical possibility that if there were also prison records
indicating a major health event that caused hypertension during
his incarceration,202 the Secretary could use those records to
defeat the presumption of service connection under (B)(ii) by
relying on that event as the start of McMullan’s hypertension.
And finally, there is no evidence of McMullan’s willful
misconduct generally but there is evidence of drug use in his
claims file, specifically prison record notes and McMullan’s own
statements. That evidence was not used to evaluate service
connection, likely because those behaviors had no nexus to
202 That McMullan was incarcerated is not relevant to whether he had
hypertension in 1978 nor whether VA properly evaluated his claim. There is no indication
that McMullan experienced any health event during his incarceration that caused his
hypertension; the suggestion of that is merely a hypothetical offered to illustrate a way for
the Secretary to defeat the presumption in his favor—the Secretary would have the
opportunity to uncover any such evidence to refute the service connection.
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hypertension. Again, though, if the records indicated willful
misconduct that caused or exacerbated hypertension, the
Secretary could rely on that evidence to rebut the presumption.
Thus, assuming the Secretary was unable to rebut the
service connection on the basis of alternative evidence, VA could
then proceed with a disability rating and compensation
determination. McMullan would receive a notice of decision
including the specific rating and monthly compensation rate.
The proposed statutory approach would create a fair and just
scheme for cases of lost or destroyed records—especially given
the purported non-adversarial system, the debt owed to
veterans, and the fact that it is the government, and not the
veteran, who is traditionally responsible for safe storage of
service medical and personnel records.
CONCLUSION
Creating a presumption for service connection in cases of
lost or destroyed records is consistent with Abraham Lincoln’s
recognition of the debt owed to veterans203 and the nonadversarial nature of the veterans disability compensation
program. Without a presumption of service connection as I have
proposed here, McMullan and other veterans will continue to
face an insurmountable burden. At best, the burden leads to
delayed decisions and benefits. At worst, the burden leads to
repeated denial of claims.
In July 2015, McMullan sought assistance through
Homeless Persons Representation Project and I agreed to
provide pro bono assistance to him. The first step was requesting
his claims file, service medical records, and VA’s past rating
decisions. Months later, I received a CD with McMullan’s claims
file and rating decisions. No service medical records were
included, nor was there any explanation as to their absence.
In response to the September 2014 rating decision
denying McMullan’s claim on an incomplete record of evidence
due to no fault of his own, McMullan timely filed a Notice of
Disagreement with the following explanation:
My claims were incorrectly decided because my missing service
treatment records are being used to justify a decision of no service
connection. The VA expressly stated it will no longer try to obtain my
203 Abraham Lincoln, President, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), http://
www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html [https:// perma.cc/CN4M-XMM5] (“[L]et us strive . . . to
care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan.”); see also J.
Gary Hickman, Prologue to DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1 ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES,
Introduction, http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21_1.asp [https://perma.cc/5EZS-PGY4].

2018]

INTERMINABLE PARADE REST

515

records. Without my records, other evidence including buddy and
family statements should be used to identify my service-connected
hypertension . . . . I have included this evidence in repeated filings
with the VA.204

To date, VA has not responded. And McMullan continues
at parade rest.205

204 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Notice of Disagreement (NOD) VA Form 21-0958
§ 11A (Aug. 17, 2015) (on file with author). Homeless Persons Representation Project
sent the NOD by certified mail on August 18, 2015, and received a return receipt
confirming delivery to the Baltimore Regional Office on August 21, 2015. See E-mail from
Jeff Gold, Dir. of Pro Bono Programs, Homeless Persons Representation Project, to
author (Sept. 9, 2015, 9:25 AM EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Emily Ford, Pro
Bono Coordinator, Homeless Persons Representation Project, to author (Sept. 22, 2015
1:16 PM EST) (on file with author).
205 In August 2017, I sent a certified letter to Baltimore VA Regional Office
inquiring on the status of McMullan’s Notice of Disagreement. Letter from author to
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (Aug. 7, 2017) (on file with author). I have confirmation the
letter was delivered, but await a response. U.S. Postal Serv., Certified Mail Delivery
Confirmation (Aug. 10, 2017 11:07 AM EST) (on file with author).

